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God-Relationships With and Without God, by James Kellenberger. New 
York: st. Martin's Press, 1989. Pp. xi and 174. $39.95. 
JOSEPH RUNZO, Chapman University. 
With its purposively provocative title, this book offers a valuable analysis of 
the nature and varieties of human relationships with Divine Reality. 
Kellenberger argues (1) that meaningful (and ethical) religious praxis is a 
function of the relationship between the individual and Divine Reality and 
(2) that the same sort of fundamental relationship-an "abiding relation-
ship" -is central to all religious traditions, whether they do or do not explic-
itly involve God. In the first part of the book, which draws heavily on 
Kierkegaard's views, Kellenberger provides a direct and clear account of 
God-relationships, focusing on their moral characteristics. The second part is 
more ambitious, though ultimately less successful, addressing religious 
pluralism in terms of God-relationships. Overall, the book is written with 
admirable clarity and a skillful use of literature, from Conrad's Lord Jim 
to Tolstoy to Gide, to explicate crucial aspects of relationships with Divine 
Reality. 
The groundwork for understanding God-relationships is laid in the first part 
by analyzing the connection between God-relationships and religious moral-
ity. After explaining the notions of a guilt and a shame morality, Kellenberger 
suggests that a religious sin morality is unlike a shame morality because one 
attempts to live in accordance with one's God-relationship, not some personal 
ideal. Indeed, a religious sin morality is essentially a guilt morality, since 
violating the God-relationship is a sin. However, a religious sin morality also 
differs from ordinary guilt moralities insofar as one does not follow moral 
rules for the sake of a principle (or for self-interest), but is instead required 
to act-out of trust-for the sake of God. Thus, religious sin morality in-
volves a faith relationship. 
Faith involves beliefs about the "object" of faith. In contradistinction to a 
faith relationship, Kellenberger next develops the notion of an "abiding rela-
tionship." He has in mind here such relationships as "walking humbly with 
God," "seeking to do what is right," "love of neighbor," and even being a 
"devout skeptic" (pp. 84-89). Thus an abiding relationship is "a relationship 
to Divine Reality ... [where] the individual may not become conscious of 
being related to Divine Reality ... [and] which is not dependent on a belief in 
Divine Reality ..... (p. 83). Kellenberger then employs this notion of an abid-
ing relationship to address the pressing problem of religious pluralism, con-
cluding that it provides a key, even if not the sole, solution. I will consider 
three difficulties with this latter part of Kellenberger's project. 
Consider first Kellenberger's proposal that the "way of (abiding) relation-
ships" serves as a solution to the problem of religious pluralism because it 
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"recognizes the cognitivity of religion, while allowing cognitivity to recede 
in importance" (p. 140). The value of this approach is that it avoids the 
parochial limitations of the exclusivist's emphasis on tradition-specific doc-
trine. Indeed, in order to encompass the wide range of religious attitudes and 
practices, Kellenberger suggests that one might have an abiding relationship 
to Divine Reality in virtue of a commitment to justice for the oppressed, or 
the pursuit of world peace. But cast in such broad terms, how does this differ 
from secular humanism? And why call such relationships God-relation-
ships-or even religious relationships? Despite Kellenberger's interesting 
idea that, without explicit or implicit theistic cognitive content, one might 
have a "God-relationship without God," it remains unconvincing that non-
theistic abiding relationships, such as Brahman-relationships, can be properly 
referred to as "God-relationships" (and vice versa). In general, the more one 
insists that abiding relationships do not require (some) correct knowledge, or 
at least true beliefs, about Divine Reality, the less likely they are to be 
properly directed to Divine Reality, ensuing in correct religious praxis. Yet 
the more one allows that knowledge, or true belief, about the "object" of the 
relation is essential to all religious relations, the less successful is 
Kellenberger's resolution of the conflicts among differing religious tradi-
tions: for then God-relationships appear to differ fundamentally from non-
theistic relationships. 
Kellenberger never entirely makes clear the ultimate significance of the 
cognitive in religion, and religious relationships. He is quite clear in de-
veloping the notion of a faith relationship to God that faith necessarily 
involves belief. But in preparation for his eventual solution to the problem 
of religious pluralism, Kellenberger argues that "given the logic of belief 
in or faith in ... one can have a wrong conception of God and yet believe 
or have faith in Him" (p. 77). While there are important limits to how 
misguided one's conception can be-for faith involves trust, implying that 
God must be personal-Kellenberger concludes that different religious tradi-
tions, despite even mutually incompatible beliefs about God, "yet believe 
in the same God." This brings us to a second, related problem, regarding 
God-relationships. 
It can of course turn out that two individuals with radically opposed beliefs 
about some entity are actually referring to, acting toward, holding beliefs 
about, etc. that entity. But believing in or having faith in the same God 
requires more than this. For right religious praxis, based on faith, requires 
a proper directedness toward the object of belief. One who believes God 
is malevolent and acts on that belief, and one who believes in the God of 
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, do not have faith in the same God. Hence, we 
need a fuller explication of the extent to which theistic beliefs can be 
incompatible, and still be about God. And extending this point, we need to 
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know more about the degree to which beliefs in theistic and non-theistic 
traditions can be incompatible, and still count in a like sense as "abiding 
relationships. " 
This brings us to a third and more significant problem with the notion of 
an "abiding relationship." Kellenberger suggests that one has an abiding 
relationship with Divine Reality through commitment and practice, not in 
virtue of one's particular beliefs or the nature of one's faith. From this he 
concludes that persons with non-personal, as well as persons with personal, 
conceptions of the Divine-and even those with non-religious world-views 
like Marxism or secular humanism-can have like abiding relationships. If 
so, abiding relationships would provide a commonality, and perhaps even a 
sort of global glue, which resolves the apparent conflict among the world 
religions. Yet while the resultant acceptance of diverse religious viewpoints 
would be both desirable and important, this religious harmony is bought at 
considerable cost. For Kellenberger also insists that there must be a Divine 
Reality (or possibly Realities) to which individuals are related in abiding 
relationships. But this runs the danger of becoming a contentless notion, 
where "Divine Reality" is not to be understood as either theistic or non-the-
istic, much less specifically Christian or Advaita Vedantic. The prima facie 
advantage of the sort of resolution of the problem of religious pluralism which 
Kellenberger proposes is that the question of the correctness of the truth-
claims of each tradition becomes "relatively unimportant" (p. 141). But as 
the examples Kellenberger himself uses to illustrate this show, the more the 
cognitive content of religion is set aside, the less clear it becomes whether 
the purported resolution is effected. For most fundamentally, it is unclear 
whether there can be abiding relationships which, as Kellenberger holds, are 
not at all a matter of belief. 
One problem, to which Kellenberger is sensitive, is that non-theistic reli-
gious traditions, much as Zen Buddhism and Advaitist forms of Hinduism, 
do not seem to involve a relationship to Divine Reality. Kellenberger's solu-
tion is (a) we do not need to determine if the Christian, say, and the Buddhist 
are in exactly the same sort of abiding relationship, and (b) for the non-the-
istic traditions, it is enlightenment or realization which functions as the key, 
religious relationship (p. 145). Regarding (a), the question is not whether 
there is some sort of relationship centrally operative in all world religions, 
but rather whether the operative relationships are the right sort to provide a 
significant likeness among them. This remains unsettled. More specifically, 
regarding (b), for Kellenberger "abiding with God" is paradigmatic and it is 
hard to see how "relating to the Eightfold Path in Theravada Buddhism" 
(Kellenberger's example) is, in an illuminating way, like relating to a personal 
Deity. For instance, the ethical dimension of a faith relationship to God which 
Kellenberger explicates does not seem applicable to one's "relationship" to 
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a non-personal "way." Kellenberger does suggest that whether the Christian 
and Buddhist are in the same abiding relationship (love of neighbor and God, 
and compassion for the world, respectively) would be determined by the 
sameness of practice (love or compassion). Even so, we are still left wonder-
ing precisely which features of their respective practices we are to look at to 
see if the Theravada Buddhist and the Christian are alike in their respective 
religious relationships. Again, Kellenberger's account of abiding relation-
ships lacks sufficient content to provide a resolution. 
To illustrate his view of abiding relationships, Kellenberger suggests two 
analogies (p. 82 & 141). Just as one may walk with another without knowing 
the other, or even that the other is there, so too, Kellenberger suggests, one 
can walk with God in an abiding relationship without knowing God. However, 
while one might perform the act of walking next to someone without knowing 
it, this does not parallel the sense in which the theist says that someone "truly" 
walks with God. Put in Kellenberger's terms, if God exists, then in a sense 
all creatures "walk with God," but not all have a (personal) relationship with 
God. As Kellenberger acknowledges, one must consider an individual's back-
ground beliefs to understand his or her actions. Thus, one's beliefs differen-
tiate standing around idly from surreptitiously watching others under the 
guise of a languid pose. Just so, the difference between walking along with 
God and truly walking with God, between co-existing with God and relating 
to God, is, in part, a matter of one's beliefs: e.g., Christian beliefs which 
conflict with Buddhist, and Hindu, and Moslem beliefs. Since beliefs are a 
determining factor of religious praxis, the conflict between the world reli-
gions remains. Again, Kellenberger suggests that every monogamous man 
can say "my wife is the best wife in the world" without mutual contradiction 
if thereby understood as proclaiming their "right individual relationships to 
their wives." Likewise, suggests Kellenberger, adherents of the great world 
religions can be in similar abiding relationships, even though their beliefs 
conflict (p. 141). But this does not dissolve the literal contradiction among 
the truth-claims of the married, or the truth-claims of the world religions-it 
is just to set aside the cognitive content of those claims. 
In sum, Kellenberger comes up against the same problem which confronts 
other pluralist solutions (like that of John Hick, whose work Kellenberger 
draws upon) to the conflicting truth-claims of the world religions. Either the 
specificity of the claims of each world religion is taken seriously-and then 
the truth-claims certainly appear to conflict-or the claims are set aside, or 
reduced in relevance-and then there is no real harmony because there is 
little substantive, cognitively significant content in the world religions to 
harmonize. Kellenberger's attempt to resolve this problem is original and 
ambitious. But within his particular account, either the world religions may 
be viewed as being in close accord, but at the cost of diluting the notion of 
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an "abiding relationship," or God-relationships do not really apply to non-
theistic relationships, and the problem of apparent contradiction among the 
world religions remains unresolved. Even so, Kellenberger helps us see the 
seminal importance of abiding relationships. And his development of the 
notion of an abiding relationship is illuminating in itself, especially when 
applied individually to Christianity, or other world religions. 
